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INTRODUCTION

S

ince the title of my talk is hardly self-explanatory, I want to begin by
outlining my topic. My overall concern is with the proper place of
religious convictions in lawmaking in our society. My special focus is on
the place of religious convictions in the political resolution of churchstate issues.
We hear with some frequency that one group or another is attempting
to impose its religious views on the rest of us. The clear implication of
such remarks is that impositions of this kind are not in accord with the
underlying premises of our liberal democracy. A constitutional claim may
lurk in the background: that legislation constituting an imposition would
violate the religion guarantees of the Constitution. But the main force of
the complaint is not legal. It is that people who try to impose their
religious views are not playing by the rules of our kind of government.
This is a claim about the political philosophy of liberal democracy.
Though I shall comment in passing on various constitutional issues,
the main thrust of my comments also lies within the domain of political

* The text of this Article, with minor changes, was presented as the Thirty-Seventh
Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland, Ohio,
November 5, 1986.
** Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of Law.
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philosophy. I want to ask how far citizens and public officials properly
rely on religious convictions as they formulate positions on political
issues. I ask more particularly how far they do so in respect to what are
commonly identified as church-state problems.
What I am going to say does not have the same sort of potential practical
effect as a proposed rule of law. I am not primarily concerned with external
restraint, but with how people in our society decide and debate important
political issues. If you were to find my remarks wholly convincing, a most
unlikely supposition, their force might affect how you looked at things and
evaluated the positions of others. Over time such altered perceptions could
make a difference, but neither the changes in perceptions nor their effects
on political outcomes would be easily discernible.
My remarks should be viewed against one particular perspective about
how citizens and officials should reach political judgments. Roughly the
idea, notably represented in the work of our greatest social philosopher,
John Rawls,i and of my brilliant colleague, Bruce Ackerman, 2 is that in
our liberal democracy people should reach political decisions on the basis
of shared political principles and publicly accessible reasons. A restriction to these bases would prevent both attempts by citizens to promote
particular religious positions in the political process and self-conscious
reliance on religious convictions in determining their stances on political
issues. No one supposes that religious citizens will ever be wholly
uninfluenced by their particular religious convictions; the thesis is that
in their political lives they should try to be. What this means in the
context of church-state issues is that people should try to adopt a
perspective that is neutral among religious positions, one that does not
assume, for example, the truth of fundamentalist Protestantism, liberal
Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, Judaism in some form, or atheism.
In fact, many arguments that are often advanced about church-state
issues do meet this constraint. When people urge that religious schools
should receive state aid because the state should pay for the secular
benefits the schools provide and because people should be free to practice
their religious faith as they see fit, their arguments should carry force
with nonreligious persons as well as religious ones. The arguments are
not dependent on any particular view about religious truth.
I agree with one fundamental premise of those who wish to exclude
religious convictions. I agree that the promotion of religious views and
practices is not the business of the state in our society. Nevertheless, I
strongly resist the idea that either this premise or any other premise
underlying our liberal democracy requires good liberal citizens to try to
disregard their religious convictions when they resolve many political

' See, e.g., J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); Rawls, Justice as Fairness:Political
Not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223 (1985).
2 B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980).
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issues. The emphasis of my remarks is that we should not expect people
to try to resolve important church-state issues in this way.
Perhaps my most important insight is that discussions of the place of
religious convictions tend to oversimplify many of the relevant questions.
You may respond that such is the nature of all political debate; but the
difficulty is even greater in this area, perhaps because of people's sensitivity about religion. If I accomplish nothing else, I hope I can persuade
you that the problem is complex and deserves our careful thought, not
misleading slogans.
I shall roughly distinguish three different ways in which religious
convictions may figure in political choice. I argue that citizens and
legislators should not rely on religious convictions in the first two ways,
but that they often may properly rely on them in the third way.
I indicate the implications of these general conclusions for church-state
issues. What I mean by church-state issues are issues that directly
involve the treatment of religious practices, groups or believers. My three
main illustrations are school prayer and a moment of silence, public aid
to parochial schools, and accommodations to religious conscience. What I
treat as other issues of public policy include matters like abortion,
"deviant" sexual acts, and military preparedness. These are issues as to
which religious convictions may figure, but they do not directly concern
religious practices, organizations or persons.
The first way in which religious views may figure in political choice is
when a citizen or legislator takes the promotion of good religious
perspectives as a political objective. The second way religious views may
figure is in leading people to identify practices as wrong simply because
the practices offend religious ideas of correct behavior. The third way is
that religious convictions can influence one's sense of how society should
best protect interests that can be understood in nonreligious terms. These
convictions can affect one's views of which entities warrant protection, of
what are relevant facts, and of how clashes among competing values
should be resolved. As I have said, my claim is that the first two kinds of
reliance on religious convictions are not appropriate, but that the third
kind of reliance is proper. After quickly indicating my views about the
first two sorts of reliance, I shall concentrate my efforts on the third,
which is the subject of great confusion and uninformed disagreement.
II.

SPONSORSHIP OF RELIGIOUS VIEWS

Beginning with Everson v. Board ofEducation3 in 1947, Supreme Court
cases interpreting the Establishment Clause stand for the principle that
government should not sponsor religious views or practices. This idea,

3

330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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that the promotion of religion is not the business of the government, has
animated decisions that sharply restrict public aid to private sectarian
education, 4 that bar organized prayer in public schools, 5 and that protect
the teaching of evolution. 6 Not every decision fits this principle comfortably. One thinks, for example, of the cases upholding tax exemptions, 7
permitting creches in public parks,8 and sustaining prayer by paid
chaplains before legislative bodies.9 But whatever it has done, the
Supreme Court has not strayed from stated adherence to the basic
principle of nonsponsorship.
As a constitutional standard, this principle has been subject to two
related objections. One is that the Establishment Clause applies directly
only to the federal government and was not made applicable against the
states by the fourteenth amendment. Despite the Court's consistent
assumption since Everson that the rule of no establishment does apply to
the states, this issue never quite dies. Although the point is within the
realm over which reasonable people can argue, the Establishment Clause
is very closely linked to the Free Exercise Clause. In my opinion, sound
interpretive practices have made both applicable against the states. In
any event, the rule to that effect is firmly settled, and since most states
have their own constitutional language barring establishment of religion, the particular reach of federal constitutional law is not critical for
most practical purposes.
The second objection to the constitutional principle of nonsponsorship
is more troubling. It is that the First Amendment, and analogous state
provisions, were not meant to bar government sponsorship of religious
ideas, or Christian ideas, or Judeo-Christian ideas in general; they were
meant only to bar preferences for particular sects and their ideas. My own
view, undefended here, is that given the present degree of religious
diversity in the United States, the Constitution has rightly been interpreted to encompass a broad principle of nonsponsorship. Whether or not
its use as a constitutional standard is correct, the principle of
nonsponsorship is sound as a matter of political philosophy. It most
adequately represents our country's tradition of religious tolerance and
government separation from religion as applied to modern social conditions. Although religious underpinnings may be supportive of a healthy
civic order, I strongly doubt that the way to provide them is by
government promotion of religious ideas. I thus begin my reflections on

4 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).

Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
Walz v. Tax Comm'r of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
s Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
9 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).

6

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss2/3

4

1987]

CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

what citizens and officials should do with the judgment that our liberal
government should not sponsor religious ideas and practices.
What implications, if any, does this judgment have for the activities of
individuals? One understanding of liberal democracy with a written constitution is that people may appropriately urge whatever programs they
want for whatever reasons matter to them. On this understanding, constraints on what the government should do become relevant only when
official government action is taken or when officials deliberate about what
to do. Moreover, the constraints may concern only forbidden outcomes, not
the motivations that determine choice within the permissible range of
outcomes. I accept a richer view of the significance of constraints on what
our government should do. I assume, first, that good liberal citizens should
not promote outcomes that would themselves be improper. Thus, if
nonsponsorship is a sound political principle, citizens guided by the underlying premises of our polity should not seek to get the government to
sponsor particular religious perspectives. Further, for outcomes within the
permissible range, a good liberal citizen does not support one outcome
rather than another because he thinks it likely to promote the improper
objective in some direct way. Suppose it were true that membership in the
Serbian Orthodox church increases in the United States when relations
with Yugoslavia are good. A desire to increase membership in that church
is not in and of itself a proper reason for supporting a particular foreign
policy toward Yugoslavia, since, from the standpoint of our liberal government, whether people belong to the Serbian Orthodox church, another
church, or no church is not a matter of concern. So also, it would be wrong
to support a prohibition on homosexual acts because one hoped that such
a prohibition would enhance acceptance of a particular religious faith that
condemns such acts as wrong. This constraint on one's grounds of support
for particular political views applies not only to the bases on which one
advocates a position, but also to the grounds one takes as determinative
in developing a position for oneself.
What is the importance of these conclusions for church-state issues? I
do not want to suggest that supporting an outcome that has been declared
unconstitutional is necessarily illiberal. A citizen may think that the
constitution has been wrongly interpreted or should be altered in some
respect. Political opposition to positions taken by the Supreme Court is
within the range of good liberal citizenship. But the good liberal citizen
should not support an outcome that he recognizes is at odds with the basic
principle of nonsponsorship. And when a certain form of government
involvement, say financial aid to religious hospitals, is within the
boundaries permitted by the basic principle of nonsponsorship, a good
citizen should not support a particular degree or kind of assistance for the
reason that such assistance will promote the religion in which he
believes.
I turn now to a trickier point. Suppose Janet takes the following
attitude:
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Various private activities that serve the public get public support. I am especially interested in this religious hospital and I
should like it to flourish, partly because of its religious significance. I think I and people like me are entitled to a degree of
support similar to that given similar nonreligious private activities.
Such grounds for assistance do not violate the principle of nonsponsorship, as I understand it. The significance of Janet's religion
figures indirectly here. Her interest in the hospital does derive partly
from its promotion of religious values and she does seek state support of
the hospital, but she recognizes that the basis for state support is not
promotion of any religious message, but serving public welfare in a more
general sense and according parity among useful private activities. This
basis of seeking state aid, though perhaps only subtly distinguished from
seeking to have one's religious values promoted, is not out of step with
liberal principles.
My conclusions about official actions are consonant with those I have
drawn about private individuals. Officials should not be guided by the
aim of sponsoring religious positions, nor should they defer to constituency opinion that is based on that aim.
III.

RELIGIOUS NOIONS OF WRONG

A different role that religious convictions can play in political decisions
is to affect judgment about what is wrongful behavior. A person may wish
the state to prevent wrongful acts even though he does not expect it to
promote his particular religious perspectives. In this section, I shall first
address what I shall call judgments of wrongness independent of harm to
secular interests. Such judgments are rarely involved in typical churchstate issues, but it is important to distinguish them from judgments that
are often made in church-state contexts.
The most convenient example for "pure" judgments of wrongness is
consenting sexual acts among adults. Is it appropriate for the government
to forbid such acts simply because they are deemed wrong? Is it appropriate for citizens to support such prohibitions simply because they
believe such acts are wrong?
The Supreme Court faced this issue as a matter of constitutional law in
Bowers v. Hardwick,1° the 1986 case involving a homosexual's challenge
to Georgia's sodomy statute. For the Court, Justice White rejected out of
hand the claim that, for constitutional purposes, belief in the immorality
of homosexual sodomy is not enough by itself to ground a prohibition.11

10 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
" Id. at 2846.
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The four dissenters took a different view. For them, Justice Blackmun
asserted that "The legitimacy of secular legislation depends . . . on

whether the State can advance some justification for its law beyond its
conformity to religious doctrine."'12 The dissent makes clear that what it
thinks is needed is some genuine damage to cognizable interests.
My concern here does not lie either in the constitutionality or overall
wisdom of a prohibition of homosexual acts. I am focusing on what are
appropriate bases for legislation in this polity. Let me be a little more
precise about how my concern differs from the constitutional question.
First, legislators may be permitted constitutionally to make some decisions that are not in accord with underlying premises of our liberal
democracy. Constitutional permissibility does not establish soundness
from the standpoint of political philosophy. Second, unconstitutionality
does not necessarily establish that legislation is based on improper
grounds. A statute based on appropriate grounds may still be invalid
because it impinges on some fundamental liberty. I am not evaluating the
moral or legal strength of the claim that people should be left free to
make basic decisions about sexual expression; I am only asking whether
particular grounds for restriction are proper.
One further clarification is needed. I am not considering claims that
certain sexual acts undermine marriages or make the people who engage
in them unhappy. Such claims do refer to the secular interests of others
or of the actors themselves. I address only the simpler claim: "These
acts should be stopped because they are unnatural and wrong in themselves."
For this claim, it may clarify matters to focus on sodomy committed by
married couples, almost certainly constitutionally protected under
3
but covered by the Georgia statute as written.
Griswold v.Connecticut,"
It is not easy to perceive how oral and anal sex is likely to hurt the lives
of the married couple themselves or of others. Suppose that someone
concedes this, but believes that these sexual acts are forbidden by God. Is
that opinion, if widely shared, an appropriate basis for prohibiting the
acts? I claim that it is not. Let me repeat that I am not relying here on
some fundamental right of the married couple to choose their own sexual
practices, a right that could outweigh otherwise legitimate reasons to
prohibit. Rather, I am asserting that this reason to prohibit is itself not
legitimate.
The rationale for my position is based on the principle of
nonsponsorship. If promotion of religion is not the business of the state,
laws should serve some interest comprehensible in secular terms. If all
that can be said about a practice is that it violates a religious notion of

12

Id. at 2854-55.

13381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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wrong, then to prohibit that practice is to force a religious morality on
persons who do not accept it. Although the aim of the legislation may not
be to promote any particular religious perspective, the legislation does
implement a religious perspective about proper behavior, and it does so
without any assertion of danger to secular interests. That is improper in
a liberal democracy.
In light of these remarks, the majority opinion in Bowers is revealed as
deeply unsatisfactory on the relevant point. Justice White comments,
"The law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws

representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed."' 14 This passage
blurs the different sorts of moral judgments that underlie prohibitive
legislation. Usually the notions of morality that count are ideas about
how to protect undeniable interests. Relatively few laws rest on moral
judgments that are detached from serious claims of harm to secular
interests.
I want now briefly to address some complexities. Whenever people
think that God forbids behavior, the knowledge that people engage in the
behavior may cause them some unhappiness. Further a failure to prohibit
may involve some cost in social cohesion. Are these legitimate bases for
prohibition even if the direct aim to suppress the wrong is not? I am
inclined to think that in a liberal society such bases for prohibition, when
they are parasitic on people's underlying notion that harmless behavior
is wrong, should be treated with great suspicion. Perhaps simple unhappiness that comes from knowing that "bad" acts are taking place should
never count, and a social cohesion argument for enforcing illiberal
impulses should carry the day only if the severe strains of a contrary legal
approach are indisputable. In any event, the strength of claims based on
unhappiness and social cohesion will depend in context on factual
judgments that are quite different from the simple conclusions that many
people condemn the behavior.15
The principle I have defended is that in our society behavior should not
be prohibited simply because it offends religious notions of wrong; such
ideas of offensiveness are not an appropriate basis for citizens to support
prohibitions. 16 As I have said, this principle has little importance for
typical church-state issues; but it affords an important standard of

14

106 S. Ct. at 2846.

No doubt people who condemn behavior as wrong often think it also does have
harmful effects on those who engage in it and on others, and their religious beliefs may
affect those judgments. What I have said so far does not touch these evaluations.
16 Strictly speaking this principle can also be extended to reach nonreligious notions of
wrong that bear no relation to secular interests; but such nonreligious notions of wrong do
15

not figure prominently in this country.
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comparison for kinds of reliances on religious convictions that do touch
those issues.
IV.
A.

RELIGIOUSLY INFLUENCED JUDGMENTS ABOUT PROTECTING INTERESTS

Determination of Facts, Weighing of Conflicting Values, and
Borderline of Status

So far, we have barely begun to see how religious convictions can
influence political judgments. On many important questions, a religious
person's convictions will affect the way he decides what secular interests
warrant protection and how much protection they warrant. Barbara may
believe that scripture, or authoritative statements by church leaders, or
individual prayer yields an answer to some moral or political question; or
more general religious premises, like the centrality of the life of Jesus,
may guide the perspectives she adopts. Often she may not be aware of the
precise role her religious convictions play. I shall pay less attention to the
kind of religious conviction that is influential than to the sort of political
judgments they may influence.
Political decisions depend on a mix of evaluative and factual determinations. Suppose the issue is whether the county should agree to
sweeping arms control limitations with the Soviet Union. Agreement will
render the country somewhat vulnerable, but will certainly be in our
long-term interest if the agreement is observed by both sides. In part the
decision whether to agree turns on prediction of the likely behavior of
Soviet leaders. Religions typically interpret human nature in some
particular way. Adherents of different religious stances may have subtly
different estimates of how people, or antireligious people, will respond to
novel contingencies. An illustration of this reality is afforded by a very
rough comparison of the attitudes of theologically conservative Protestants with those of theologically liberal Protestants. The former generally evidence a strong distrust of Communist leaders, the latter tend to be
more sanguine about the possibilities of cooperation between our country
and the Soviet Union. When religious convictions bear on factual
determinations, those who rely on them are not imposing unaccepted
value choices on nonbelievers; they are making the best judgments they
can about how to serve shared objectives.
Government policies often must involve choices among desirable or
undesirable outcomes. Suppose that a generous welfare policy will
increase the standard of living of the poorest members of society, but, by
reducing work incentives, will reduce the overall average standard of
living as compared with a less generous welfare policy. If Paul's religious
faith teaches that care for the poor is the preeminent demand of social
justice, he is likely to suppose that the sacrifice in average welfare is
warranted. In this instance, his religious convictions are employed to
resolve a conflict between competing objectives, the welfare of the poor
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and average welfare, each of which by itself is widely regarded as
desirable.
The most striking and controversial use of religious convictions is to
help resolve borderlines of status. Some political decisions turn on how
important certain kinds of entities are. Religious convictions can figure
in respect to animal rights, the treatment of severely handicapped babies,
and the definition of death, but the most notable example is abortion.
Proper legal treatment of abortion depends substantially on the proper
moral view of the status of the fetus. Religious convictions often affect
what people think is the moral status of the fetus at various stages of
development. Someone who believes a fetus at some stage has the same
moral status as a full human being is much more likely to support a
restrictive approach to abortion at that stage than someone who thinks
the fetus has no moral entitlement.
Although the point is often unrecognized, religious convictions figure
here in quite a different way than they do when allthat is claimed is that
behavior is wrong from a religious point of view. In respect to abortion,
the convictions influence judgment about which entities count as members of the community. The protection to be given these entities,
protection of life, is protection of the most fundamental secular interest
that members of a community have. What is involved is not a disregard
of secular interests in favor of competing religious notions, but use of
religious ideas to determine what is the range of secular interests that
warrant protection.
In the major abortion case of the 1985 term, Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetriciansand Gynecologists,17 Justice Stevens, concurring,
and Justice White, dissenting, commented on the relationship between
religious convictions and views about abortion. Unfortunately, both
comments are substantially misleading. Justice Stevens acknowledges
that "a powerful theological argument" can be made for the position that
"the governmental interest in protecting fetal life is equally compelling
during the entire period from the moment of conception until the moment
of birth."' Justice Stevens' response is that "our jurisdiction is limited to
the evaluation of secular state interests." 19 A footnote to that passage
talks about the lack of state responsibility for the soul of a newly born or
unborn. 20 Contrary to what Stevens implies, the main claim for legal
protection of fetuses does not rest on the state of their souls, but on their
right to have their potential human lives protected. As I have indicated,
that is a secular interest. What Justice White says on the subject is
hardly more clarifying. He denies that according the fetus a high status

106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
"' Id. at 2188.
17

19

20

Id.

Id., n.7.
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from conception is "a theological position."21 Referring to the proscription
of killing in the Ten Commandments and the laws against murder, he
says "a State cannot avoid taking a position that will correspond to some
religious beliefs and contradict others. '22 That much is undoubtedly true;
if a state forbids racial segregation, it implicitly rejects the religious
position that God requires racial segregation. But laws against murder
and racial segregation are fully supportable on grounds that make no
reference to religious claims. It is precisely the argument against a
restrictive abortion law that such nonreligious grounds do not support it.
So we find that Justice White obscures the possibly critical role of
religious conviction in the anti-abortion position, while Justice Stevens
obscures the fact that the position does not demand acceptance of other
than secular interests.
What is the proper role of religious conviction in matters like those I
have mentioned, arms control, welfare, and abortion? Remember, I am
not now talking about either what is constitutionally allowable or what
is, overall, desirable legislation. As I suggested in respect to consenting
sexual acts, a ground may be constitutionally permissible and improper
as a matter of political philosophy; and a ground for restriction that itself
is proper may be overridden by a competing fundamental right, e.g., the
right of a woman to control her body, that may render a prohibition
undesirable or unconstitutional.
My general position is this. Liberal democracy involves a limited
commitment to publicly accessible reasons and shared premises ofjustice.
But when these are inconclusive, when people must revert to fundamental personal beliefs, neither the principle of nonsponsorship nor any other
sound premise of our liberal democracy requires citizens to disregard the
import of their religious convictions as they bear on critical factual
determinations, conflicts of undeniable secular values, and borderlines of
status. As citizens may rely on these convictions, legislators may give
weight to the resulting judgments and may, when other grounds are not
available, rely on similar judgments of their own.
B.

Church-StateIssues

The time has come to apply these general perspectives to issues that
more directly concern church or religion and the state. The central
question is whether religious citizens can reasonably be expected to try to
decide such questions independent of their own religious convictions. I
shall consider school prayer and a moment of silence, accommodations to
religious conscience, and public aid to religious institutions that confer
secular benefits.

21 Id. at 2197, n.4.
22

Id.
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1. Organized School Prayer and a Moment of Silence
Various arguments for and against organized school prayer are compatible with the premises of a liberal society. The main argument against
school prayer is that in a society in which church and government are
separate, the state should not be sponsoring religious exercises. If the
state should not be sponsoring any particular religious view, a widely
accepted premise, then any school prayer is bound to be highly dubious.
Either the state itself composes or endorses particular prayers, or it
leaves formulations to individual students, thereby in effect bolstering
majority views over time. Any prayer undoubtedly is in tension with the
somewhat more controversial premise that I accept, that the state also
should not sponsor religion over nonreligion.
Of the claims in favor of group prayer in the public schools, I shall
mention two: that since school occupies so much of the child's day, not to
allow such prayer is to limit the possibilities of effective worship; and,
that if the schools shut off all possibilities of organized group worship
during the school day, the implicit message that is conveyed is that God
and religion are unimportant.
Whatever its relevance for soldiers and prisoners, the argument in favor
of prayer that concerns the time students are in school is implausible, at
least for those whose religion does not demand prayer at particular times
of day. Students have plenty of time outside school to engage in prayer.
The second argument is more disturbing. If in their most important
social grouping outside the family, students are precluded from an opportunity of shared religious experience, then the implicit message of this
school time may be that religion is not so important. This worry is softened,
though not wholly eliminated, by the possibility that voluntary subgroups
df students may be able to engage in group prayer outside of ordinary class
time, say, during lunch. Since the liberal state should not be in the
business of denigrating religion, practices that convey the message that
religion does not matter much are not wholly consonant with liberal
premises.
A person's assessment of the argument that students should have an
opportunity for shared religious experience need not be directly determined by his religious convictions. Many religious people do not accept the
argument; they believe religion can receive adequate emphasis elsewhere,
in settings that do not put subtle pressures for conformity on those with
minority views. On the other hand, some nonbelievers might be persuaded
that fairness and neutrality indicate some place in school for voluntary
prayer by interested students in the organized classroom setting.
ln contrast with organized school prayer, which now is plainly precluded by Supreme Court doctrine, 23 a moment of silence at the beginning

23 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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of the school day apparently remains a permissible constitutional option.24 Most of the arguments for and against a moment of silence are
similar to those applying to oral prayer, but their strength varies
significantly. Though most people will understand that a silent moment
is made available largely so that students who wish will have a chance to
pray, the moment of silence constitutes a much weaker encouragement to
religious practice and involves little or no imposition on those with
unorthodox religious beliefs. As with organized prayer, a person's overall
appraisal of the arguments for and against a moment of silence need not
depend directly on his religious beliefs.
With respect to both issues, however, religious convictions may affect
judgment once a person recognizes the competing considerations: that
establishing prayers or silence may constitute some support to religion
that trenches upon a principle of nonsponsorship and that refusal to have
prayers or silence may indirectly convey the implicitly secularist message that religion is not central to life. When someone must squarely
decide which horn of the dilemma to choose, his view of the value of public
or silent prayers within large social groups that are not selected on
religious bases may matter. And his estimate of the value of prayer in
groups will almost certainly rest on his religious convictions. If George
thinks religious beliefs are foolish and prayer a superstitious practice, the
risk of indirect and implicit support of secularism will seem more
tolerable than the state's relatively slight but direct support to religion
involved in group prayer. If Agnes is persuaded that general group prayer
or shared silence, largely employed for prayer, is important religiously
and that religious practice is critical for human life, the tolerability of
risks may seem reversed. It is not easy to see how George and Agnes could
even approach this question while suspending all opinion about the value
of religious practice. Since shared values and common forms of reasoning
themselves provide no answer to the intrinsic importance of various
religious practices, George and Agnes could not be expected to estimate
the acceptability of the relevant risks without any reference to their own
religious convictions. These would affect not only which risk a person
would prefer to have run in respect to his own children, but also his view
of which risk the public as a whole could better afford.
My own position about organized public school prayer is that the
argument against it, based on the directness of the state's involvement
and on the subtle coercion of group prayer on children of minority views,
is so clearly the stronger that such prayer should be regarded as
inappropriate in a liberal pluralist society. Moreover, I think our Constitution has properly been interpreted to require that result. A moment of

24 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)(striking down moment of silence legislation

because of obvious religious purpose).
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silence, properly instituted and practiced, is much less threatening to
liberal premises and is constitutionally acceptable, though its religious
value is doubtful. In any event, my main point here is that liberalism
does not demand that citizens attempt to resolve these questions wholly
without reference to their own religious perspectives.
2.

Claims of Conscience

Citizens and officials must evaluate claims that exceptions from
ordinary rules should be made for those who have conscientious reasons
for acting differently. The best known example is the problem whether
conscientious objectors should be granted an exemption from required
military service, an issue that arises even in a volunteer army for persons
presently under a commitment to serve. Another example is the problem
whether the government should require that employers make special
accommodations in terms of days off or working conditions for those who
conscientiously cannot work on certain days or under certain conditions.
One question that arises is whether any exemption from a particular rule
should be granted; a second question is whether an exemption should be
cast in terms of religious belief and association.
Common forms of reasoning have a substantial bearing on the possibility of exemptions for those whose conscience forbids their conformance
to ordinary requirements, and on how such exemptions should be
formulated. On the one hand, futilely demanding that people do what
they regard as morally abhorrent is not the most productive use of rules,
and is bound to cause resentment among those whose conscience is
burdened. Moreover, casting an exemption in religious terms might
reasonably be thought to make more accurate administration possible or
to identify a class whose feelings of conscience will be especially strong,
and to represent a proper accommodation to a sphere of life that may
conflict with state authority.
On the other hand, exceptions may generate inequity, prove difficult to
administer, and weaken the force of a rule's general application. Furthermore, any straight preference for religious conscientious claims over
nonreligious ones tends toward state support ofreligion and may be unfair,
and religiosity may be thought an inaccurate or inappropriate basis for
recognizing those with especially strong claims or for simplifying administration. These arguments against religious categorization have generally been thought to have persuaded the Supreme Court in the Seeger 25
and Welsh 26 cases to interpret out of existence the efforts of Congress to
limit the exemption from military service to distinctly religious objectors.

25

United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

21

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
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No untorm satisfactory answer can be given to the questions whether
there should be any exemption from an ordinary rule or practice and
whether, if so, the exemption should be cast in religious terms. As to the
creation of any exemption, much depends on the degree of need for
uniform observance and on the possibilities of fraudulent claims. As to
the possibility of defining the exempted class in terms of religion, it will
matter whether the conscientious objection is of a kind likely to be raised
by nonbelievers and whether sincere religious objectors are much easier
to identify than sincere nonreligious ones. I strongly believe that when
feasible, a system of self-selecting exemptions, in which anyone is free to
choose the alternative to what is normally demanded, but in which the
alternative carries burdens that would lead most people to choose
to the state's
subjection to the standard requirements, is far preferable
27
deciding who is and who is not a conscientious objector.
However one resolves these issues, it is unlikely that one can, or should,
try to approach them in disregard of one's own convictions about religious
and moral truth. If Michael believes that there exists an objective religious
truth whose moral demands may conflict with the state's requirements, he
may be more disposed to think that conscience should be accommodated
more than someone who does not believe in transcedent sources of moral
truth. Further, if Michael thinks that religious truth actually requires
action that is contrary to what is demanded by present state requirements,
as a religious pacifist would feel about a general conscription law, he will
rate the need for accommodation very high. A pacifist who derives his
views about war from religious premises is not required by liberal principles to put his religious convictions out of his mind when he thinks about
whether pacifists should receive an exemption.
3.

Public Aid to Religious Institutions Conferring Secular Benefits

Many religious organizations perform social services that confer an
undoubted secular benefit. One thinks of religious hospitals, religious
schools, and religious charities for the poor. If the state chooses to help
finance private nonreligious conferrals of such benefits, its failure to
assist private religious organizations may compromise its efforts and may
constitute a discrimination against religion. If the state includes religious organizations, it may end up aiding the religious purposes of the
organizations. At this time, financial aid to religious hospitals and
charities for the poor is noncontroversial. As far as financial support is
concerned, religious organizations are simply treated like other private
organizations engaging in the same endeavors. Aid to religious schools,
on the other hand, is marked by intense controversy and continuing

27 These matters are explored in much more depth in K. GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW
AND

MoRALTy, Ch. 14 (1987).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987

15

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:219

constitutional litigation. The twofold explanation for the difference
concerns the special place of the public school in the United States and
the perception that in parochial schools a close connection exists between
religious instruction and education in standard subjects.
Neither liberal principles nor constitutional clauses provide pat answers to the degree of acceptable support for religious organizations that
make direct contributions to secular objectives. Assuming that a form of
aid is constitutionally permissible, how is an individual to decide whether
that aid should be given? Let us concentrate on marginal and permitted
aid to private schools. If aid is to be given to all private endeavors, the
vast majority of beneficiaries will be religious organizations. How one
rates the importance of assisting the secular objective of the private
schools against the risks of assisting religious objectives will depend
partly on how valuable one thinks private parochial education is. Can
this judgment be made without reference to one's religious convictions? If
Sara believes that the best education for children is by religious organizations, a view that does not by itself run afoul of liberal principles, she
will be inclined to suppose that giving state support to secular functions
warrants the risk of oblique support for religious objectives. If, instead,
she believes that religious training is misconceived and harmful or that
attitudes necessary to maintain a liberal pluralist society can only be
promoted in a state school environment, she is likely to take a different
view of the harms and benefits of state aid. One's own religious convictions are bound to figure in one's estimate of the ideals for religious
education in a liberal society, as well as whether one wishes to have one's
own children supported in religious schools.
With respect to school prayer, claims of conscience, and aid to religious
institutions conferring secular benefits, we have seen that nonreligious
arguments can be offered on both sides of the issues as they arise in
particular contexts. Relying on religious conviction in the sense of
favoring a result because it will promote one's own religious views or
because it will directly embody one's religious conception of how a proper
society is organized may be at odds with liberal democratic principles; but
a good citizen could not and need not disregard his religious convictions
in assessing the balance of the ordinary arguments.
V.

DISCOURSE, OFFICIAL ACTION

AND CONSTITUTIONALITY

I have thus far addressed how a citizen develops his own position on
church-state issues. A citizen sometimes votes directly on such issues, but
more commonly they figure in support of one candidate or another or in
the citizen's efforts to get legislators to act.
Any complete account of religious convictions and church-state issues
would have to deal with a number of related subjects. I shall indicate
some of these and briefly state my position without trying to develop it.
What arguments should people use in public forums to support their
positions? Discussion in theological terms is certainly appropriate among
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those who share basic religious convictions but, in general, publicly
accessible reasons and ways of determining facts are the proper subjects
of discourse in a liberal, pluralist society. A religious believer should not
willfully conceal the effect his own religious convictions have on his
position, but he should not urge detailed religious arguments in support
of the position. What I am suggesting is that the appropriate role of
religious convictions looms larger in personal decisions about political
issues than in public dialogue over competing positions.
When religious convictions figure for citizens in the way I have suggested is proper, they are appropriately given weight by legislators whose
decision is determined partly by constituency opinion. Because legislators
represent persons of many religious persuasions, they should hesitate to
give great effect to their own religious convictions, but in situations in
which other guides are inconclusive, this reliance may also be warranted.
It is a rare church-state case in which subjective motivation is critical
to a court's determination of constitutionality. I regard the Supreme
Court's decision striking down Alabama's moment of silence statute as
such a case, though the majority opinion is susceptible of other interpretations. 28 Assuming that motivation can matter, I believe that what I
have said so far does have implications for constitutional law, though the
implications will rarely be of practical significance.
The Establishment Clause and, perhaps, notions of substantive due
process, should be viewed as sufficiently broad to encompass the constraints on political decision I have suggested. That is, a law that is
mainly designed to promote religious views or that is mainly an implementation of pure religious notions of wrong should be regarded as, in
some sense, an unconstitutional exercise of power. Whether or not courts
are equipped to undertake this inquiry or should ever actually invalidate
a law on this basis is another question, though I believe that if the
underlying ground for legislation is sufficiently clear, invalidation is
appropriate. The reason why I do not think acceptance of this principle
has much practical importance is that very rarely will an underlying
inappropriate basis for decision be both critical and clear. Reliance on
religious convictions in the way I have suggested is appropriate is no
ground for viewing the legislation that results as unconstitutional.
In sum, my message is that we need to be much more discriminating in
our understanding of the ways in which religious convictions figure in
political decisions and that the need for this more sensitive understanding applies to typical church-state problems, as well as other political
issues of public concern.

2 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). The revealed motivations of the legislators
might be thought to alter the effect of a law on the public.
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